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Article 7

COMMENTS

Section 25-530-Venue or Jurisdiction?
R. H. Beatty*
On October 26, 1957, the writer of this paper received a letter
from the Chairman of the Judicial Council enclosing a copy of a
communication sent to all the members of the Judicial Council
suggesting the consideration by the Council of the advisability of
seeking an amendment to Section 25-530 of the Nebraska Revised
Statutes' to provide for venue of actions against nonresident defendants growing out of damages caused by the operation of motor
vehicles by such nonresidents of Nebraska while using the public
highways of this state in the county in which the accident and damages occurred. The letter suggests that under present Nebraska
laws, such a nonresident, when not physically present in Nebraska,
can only be found in Lancaster County, Nebraska, where the Secretary of State of the State of Nebraska, his statutory agent, resides.
The letter further states that several district judges in this
state have held that such actions may be brought only in Lancaster
2
County, Nebraska.
A determination of the question as to whether an action against
a nonresident of the State of Nebraska for damages caused by such
nonresident in the operation of a motor vehicle upon the public
streets or highways of Nebraska can be brought in any county other
than Lancaster County, the residence of the statutory agent of the
nonresident requires the examination and consideration of five sections of Nebraska statutes, to-wit: Sections 25-408, 25-409, 25-504,
25-521, and 25-530.3
These sections of the statutes, so far as material to a discussion
herein are as follows:
Section 25-408 provides:
An action, other than one of those mentioned in sections 25-401
to 25-403, against a nonresident of this state or a foreign corporation may be brought in any county in which there may be property
*LL.B. 1912, University of Nebraska; past president, Nebraska Bar Association, member Western Nebraska and American Bar Associations; member
of the Judicial Council; presently partner in the firm of Beatty, Clarke,
Murphy, and Morgan, North Platte, Nebr.
I (Reissue 1956).

letter cites the case of White v. March, 147 Me. 68, 83 A.2d 296
(1951) as supporting such position.
3Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1956).
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of, or debts owing to said defendant, or where said defendant may
be found but if such defendant be a foreign insurance company, the
action may be brought in any county where the cause, or some part
thereof, arose.
Section 25-409 provides:
Except as may be otherwise more specifically provided by law,
every action for tort brought against a resident or residents of this
state must be brought in the county where the cause of action
arose, or in the county where the defendant, or some one of the defendants, resides, or in the county where the plaintiff resides and
the defendant, or some one of the defendants may be summoned.
Every other action must be brought, in the county in which the defendant, or some one of the defendants, resides or may be summoned.
Section 25-504, provides:
When the action is rightly brought in any county, according to
the provisions of this code, a summons shall be issued to any other
county, against any one or more of the defendants at the plaintiff's
request.
Section 25-521 provides:
In all cases where service may be made by publication, and in
all other cases where the defendants are nonresidents, and the
cause of action arose in the state, suit may be brought in the county
where the cause of action arose, and personal service of the summons may be made out of the state by the sheriff or some person
appointed by him for that purpose. In all cases where service of a
summons is made on a person without the state, proof of such service must be made by affidavit, stating the time and manner of
service. Such service shall be made in the same manner as summonses are served on parties residing within this state.
Section 25-530, so far as material, provides:
The use and operation by a nonresident of the State of Nebraska or his agent of a motor vehicle over or upon any street or
highway within the State of Nebraska, shall be deemed an appointment by such nonresident of the Secretary of State of the State of
Nebraska as his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be
served all legal processes in any action or proceeding against him,
growing out of such use or operation of a motor vehicle over or
upon the streets or highways within this state, resulting in damages
or loss to person or property, and said use or operation shall be a
signification of his agreement that any such process which is so
served in any action against him shall be of the same legal force
and validity as if served upon him personally within this state. The
appointment of agent thus made shall not be revocable by death
but shall continue and be binding upon the executor or administrator of such nonresident. Service of such process shall be made
by serving a copy thereof upon the Secretary of State, personally
in his office in the State Capitol or elsewhere or if the Secretary of
State is absent from or is not found in his office in the State Capitol
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at the time of the attempted service, by leaving a copy of all legal

processes served in the office of the Secretary of State with any
person employed in the office of the Secretary of State who, previously to such service, has been designated in writing by the Secretary of State as the person or one of the persons with whom such
copies may be left for such service upon the Secretary of State, together with a fee of two dollars, and such service shall be sufficient
service upon the said nonresident.... [Emphasis supplied.]
Section 25-409 was amended in 1937 and prior to the amendment
read as follows:
Section 25-409, 1929: Every other action must be brought in the
county in which the defendant, or some one of the defendants,
resides or may be summoned.
Now prior to the 1937 amendment to the above statute, the
statute applied where an action was rightfully brought, to nonresidents of the state as well as to residents of the state, and service
could be had upon such nonresidents of the state in any county
4
wherein they might be found or summoned.
There is now a question in the writer's mind as to whether the
last sentence of Section 25-409, to-wit:
Every other action must be brought in the county in which the
defendant or some one of the defendants resides or may be summoned.
has application to service upon nonresidents of the State of Nebraska for the reason that said statute purports to deal with the
venue of actions for tort brought against a resident or residents of
the state.
The Supreme Court in the case of Grosc v. Bredthauerf said:
We are committed to the rule, vis: "The section of an act properly amended should be construed precisely as though it had been
originally enacted in its amended form." State v Hevelone, 92 Neb.
748, 139 N.W. 636.

It may be that the Supreme Court will hold that the last sentence of Section 25-409 does, at this time, have reference to actions
against nonresidents as well as residents of the state. The Legislature, at the time of amending Section 25-409, is presumed to have
had in mind that the last sentence of Section 25-409, as it existed
prior to the amendment, had reference to nonresidents as well as
residents of the state and by adopting the identical language of
Section 20-409, 1929 Comp. Stat., as a part of the amendment, intended that said last sentence of 25-409 still applied to nonresidents

4 See Adair County Bank v. Forrey, 74 Neb. 811, 105 N. W. 714 (1905);
Lamb v. Finch, 87 Neb. 565, 127 N.W. 903 (1910).
5 136 Neb. 43, 284 N.W. 869 (1939).
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as well as residents of the state. If the last sentence of Section 25409 applies to nonresidents as well as residents of the state, then an
action against a nonresident of the state under Section 25-408 and
25-409 may be brought against such nonresident where the defendant may be found or where such defendant may be summoned.
It is clear that the last sentence of the act providing that every other
action must be brought in the county in which the defendant or
some one of the defendants resides can have no application to a nonresident of the state because a nonresident does not reside within
the state and it may be that the Legislature, in amending Section
20-409, 1929 Comp. Stat., intended the amended statute to have reference only to tort actions brought against a resident or residents
of the state, and to actions other than for tort against nonresidents
of the state.
Now Section 25-521 found under the chapter with reference to
constructive service of process provides that in all cases other than
cases where service by publication may be made, where the defendants are nonresidents of the state and the cause of action arose
in the state, suit may be brought in the county where the cause of
action arose and that personal service of summons may be made
out of the state by the sheriff or some person appointed by him for
thatpurpose.
Section 25-521 seems to be a combination of venue and service
statute but it does provide that in cases where service by publication cannot be had and where the defendants are nonresidents of
the state and where the cause of action arose in the state, suit may
be brought in the county where the cause of action arose and that
personal service of summons may be made out of the state by the
sheriff or some person appointed by him for that purpose.
It is quite clear that prior to the enactment of Section 25-530
where a nonresident defendant had an automobile accident and
caused damage while using the public streets or highways of Nebraska and had left Nebraska, either prior to or after thfe bringing of
a suit against him and where no service of summons was had upon
him while within Nebraska, personal service outside of the state
would not confer upon the court in which the action was brought,
jurisdiction over such nonresident under which a personal judgment could be rendered against him. This does not, however, lead
to the conclusion that if, under Section 25-521, an action against a
nonresident of the state can be brought in the county wherein a
cause of action arose, that subsequent legislation could not be enacted such as Section 25-530 providing for service of process upon
a statutory agent of such nonresident. If the Legislature in the
enactment of Section 25-521 meant what it said, to-wit, that in all
cases where service cannot be had upon a nonresident by publica-
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tion and where the cause of action arose in Nebraska against such
nonresident, suit may be brought in the county where the cause
of action arose, then construing Section 25-521 with Section 25-530,
suit can be brought against such nonresident of Nebraska in any
county where the cause of action arose and service had upon such
nonresident statutory agent under Section 25-530.
In consideration of the question before us, it must be recognized that Section 25-530 is in no sense a venue statute, it is only
a process statute.
In Courtney v. Meyer it is said:
It is clear that a non-resident motorist does not by the mere
statutory appointment of an agent to accept service for him, acquire
a fixed residence in the county of such agent. The non-resident
statute is only a process statute. It does not place the venue of
actions against non-resident motorists in the county of the residence of the Director of the Motor Vehicle Division; in our opinion,
it makes the latter the agent of a non-resident in any county of the
state in which the action is otherwise properly brought.7
In Thomas v. Hectors the Minnesota court said:
Statutes providing for substituted service relate simply to service of process as a means of obtaining jurisdiction of the defendant
and are not construed as extending or restricting the places where
by law an action may be brought. 9
It is also true that venue statutes relate wholly to procedure,
are remedial in nature, are to be liberally construed and are not
025

S.E.2d 481 (S.C. 1943).
See also Carter v. Schackne, 114 S.W.2d 787 (Tenn. 1938); Kennedy v.
Lee, 113 S.W.2d 1125 (Ky. 1938); Export Ins. Co. v. Womack, 165 Ga.
815, 142 S.E. 851 (1928); Roman v. Champion, 104 N.E.2d 92 (Ohio 1952);
Inter Insurance Exchange v. Wagstaff, 59 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1945);
Audubon Ins. Co. v. Schoell, 77 So.2d 53 (La. 1955).
8 12 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 1944).
9 See also Crawford v. Carson, 78 S.E.2d 268 (W.Va. 1953); Thomas v.
Altsheler, 235 S.W.2d 806 (Tenn. 1951); Schaeffer v. Alva West & Co., 4
N.E.2d 720 (Ohio 1936). In Crawford v. Carson the court held that the
statute providing that operation by nonresident of motor vehicle upon
public road in state is equivalent to appointment of state auditor to be
nonresident's attorney upon whom may be served process in action against
nonresident in state court growing out of accident or collision in state,
concerns service of process only and does not relate to fixing of venue,
and does not modify or extend statutes or common law principles concerning venue.
In Schaeffer v. Alva West & Co. the court held that the place for
instituting actions against nonresident motorists arising out of automobile
accidents within the state was governed by venue statutes and not by
statute permitting service of process in such actions upon secretary of
state.
7
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restricted in their operation to causes of action thereafter arising; 10
that in the interpretation of venue statutes, such. an interpretation
should be adopted as to serve and provide for the convenience of
the parties involved.
Attention has heretofore been called to the fact that Section
25-530 is in no sense a venue statute. Said Section does not purport
to deal with or fix venue in any respect and the law is that where
such a statute makes no provision as to venue, general rules and
statutes apply as to the venue of actions; process statutes generally
12
do not change or control the place of bringing or trial of actions.
13
The aforementioned letter cites the case of White v. March
as holding that under a statute in all respects similar to Section
25-530 an action against a nonresident motorist who has caused
damages in some county in Nebraska and is not personally present
in Nebraska so that service can be had upon him in the county
where the cause of action arose but has left the state after the accident and before service upon him, can be sued only in Lancaster
County, Nebraska, the residence of his statutory agent.
A careful study of the above case leads the writer to conclude
that the above case is not authority for the position taken. In that
case, a resident of Bridgeport, Connecticut, brought a suit against
a resident of St. John, Newfoundland, for personal injuries growing out of a collision of two automobiles in the state of Maine on
a road between Stockton Springs which is in Waldo County and
Bucksport in Hancock County. The opinion does not show in
which of these counties the accident occurred. The action was
brought in Augusta, the state capitol of Maine, where the Secretary of State had his residence and service was had on the Secre10 Gergen v. The Western Union Life Ins. Co., 149 Neb. 203, 30 N.W.2d 558
(1948); Grosc v. Bredthauer, 136 Neb. 43, 284 N.W. 869 (1939); Inter
Insurance Exchange v. Wagstaff, 59 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1945); Snavely v.
Wilkinson, 138 Ohio St. 125, 33 N.E.2d 999 (1941); Blankholm v. Fearing,
22 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1946); Mutzig v. Hope, 158 P.2d 110 (Ore. 1945);
61 C.J.S., p. 140, § 498 (b); 92 C.J.S., p. 673, § 5 (b).
11 State v. Cote, 58 A.2d 749 (N.H. 1948); Snyder v. Pitts, 241 S.W.2d 136
(Tex. 1951); Blankholm v. Fearing, 22 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1946); 92
C.J.S., p. 676 § 6.
12Lloyd Adams Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 10 S.E.2d 46 (Ga. 1940);

Courtney v. Meyer, 25 S.E.2d 48 (S.C. 1943); Carter v. Schackne, 114
S.W.2d 787 (Tenn. 1938); Roman v. Champion, 104 N.E.2d 92 (Ohio 1952);
Carroll v. Matthews, 113 S.W.2d 742 (Tenn. 1938) (in which a process

statute similar to 25-530 was involved); 92 C.J.S., p. 808, § 99; 61 C.J.S.,
p. 142, § 498 (b).
13 147 Me. 68, 83 A.2d 296 (1951).

COMMENTS
tary of State. The lower court dismissed the action for want of
jurisdiction for the reason that the Maine statute providing for
service on the Secretary of State was not complied with in that a
copy of the process served on the Secretary of State was not forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff to the defendant and
the defendant's return receipt and plaintiff's affidavit of compliance with the statute appended to the writ and filed with the clerk
of courts in which the action was pending.
The court then said:
We have given this discussion as this plaintiff may again seek
to use the statute here in question to obtain jurisdiction of this defendant. If he does so we will say that the venue of this action was
properly laid in the County of Kennebec. The statute does not
restrict the venue of the action to the county where the accident
happens or to any other particular county within the state. In the
absence of any specific designation of venue, the normal place to
bring the action was the County of Kennebec where service of process would normally be made. A statute as important as this does
not fail because no provision is made as to venue.
All the court said in the above case was that the venue was
properly laid in Kennebec County at Augusta, the state capitol.
The question was not discussed as to whether or not the action
might be brought elsewhere under Maine statutes. The writer does
not believe the case is authority for the proposition that venue
could only be laid in the residence of the statutory agent of the
defendant.
The case of Rose v. Gisi'4 is much more indicative as to what
Nebraska law is than the Maine case.
In this case, the plaintiff Rose sued Gisi doing business as Gisi
Produce Company, Victor Wascher, and Floyd Carter, and others,
in the District Court for Dundy County, Nebraska, for damages
growing out of an automobile accident occurring in Dundy County,
Nebraska. Gisi, Carter and Wascher were residents of Colorado at
the time the accident happened. Service of process was had on the
Secretary of State in accordance with the provisions of Section 20530, 1929 Laws, now as amended 25-530. The question raised was
whether the court obtained jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants and if so, whether liability attached to the defendants
Carter and Gisi. Gisi was the owner of the truck, and Carter was
a regular employee of Gisi. Wascher was sent on the trip to assist
in loading and unloading the cargo on the truck. The evidence was
that Carter was told by Gisi not to permit Wascher to drive the

14 139 Neb. 593, 298 N.W. 333 (1941).
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truck but Carter did permit Wascher to drive the truck and the
accident happened while Wascher was so driving. The opinion by
Judge Carter found that all of the defendants were liable under
the evidence and said:
We therefore hold that each of the defendants was properly
subjected to the jurisdiction of the district court for Dundy County
under the provisions of section 20-530, Comp. St. 1929.15
The law is well established in Nebraska that in the construction
of statutes the following rules apply:
The object of the court in construing an act of the Legislature
is to ascertain the intention of the lawmakers. That intention, when
ascertained, will prevail over the literal sense of the words used.
That which is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that
which is expressed.
In construing a statute the legislative intent may be gathered
from the reason for its enactment.
In construing a statue, the court must look to the object to be
accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the
purpose to be subserved, and place on it a reasonable or liberal
construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one
which will defeat it.
In enacting a statute, the Legislature must be presumed to have
had in mind all previous legislation upon the subject. In the construction of a statute courts must consider the preexisting law and
any other laws relating to the same subject.O
It is the writer's opinion that where a nonresident of the state
in the use of the public streets or highways of the state causes damage to another person by a motor vehicle, that the venue of an
action against such nonresident can be laid in the county where the
cause of action arose and that Lancaster County is not the only
county in which suit can be brought against said nonresident in
cases where the nonresident has left the state prior to the institution of an action against him and service made personally upon
him in the state.
The statutes of Nebraska have at least attempted to fully cover
and provide for the venue of actions in every possible situation.
Section 25-530 is not a venue statute, it is a process statute and
nothing else. It does not in any manner change the place where
actions could be brought prior to its enactment. It merely provides
IGThe author did not have access to the record in the Rose case and does
not know whether the question of the right to bring the action in Dundy
County was raised and briefed.

16 In re Petition of Rose Roy v. Bladen School Dist., 165 Neb. 170, 84 N.W.2d
119 (1957).
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for an additional method of service of process upon nonresident defendants in the situations covered by the provisions of the act.
It seems beyond doubt that the Legislature did not intend, in
the enactment of Section 25-530, that if a nonresident caused damage
by the use of the public highways in Banner County or Scotts Bluff
County, Nebraska, in the use of his automobile upon those highways and the plaintiff lived in one of those counties, that he was
obliged to start his suit in Lancaster County, Nebraska, and litigate
his cause of action there, when possibly all witnesses and evidentiary
facts were available and present in one of those counties and none
of them present or available in Lancaster County. It takes no
strained construction of Nebraska statutes to impute to the Legislature an intent in the enactment of the various venue statutes in
this state to permit an action to be brought against a nonresident in
the county where the cause of action arose and to permit service
of process upon his statutory agent under Section 25-530.
This opinion is apparently in conflict with the opinion of several district judges in this state on this question, although the Supreme Court of Nebraska has probably not directly passed upon
and settled the question. Until the question is settled by the Supreme Court of Nebraska, no one can rest assured as to whether or
not the action must be brought alone in Lancaster County or
whether it can be brought in the county where the cause of action
arose and that disastrous consequences could be encountered by
the bringing of such an action in the wrong venue.
It is submitted, therefore, that it would be best to seek an
amendment of the venue statutes and possibly Section 25-530 to set
the matter completely at rest.

